SERBIAN-GERMAN RELATIONS: GERMANY MAY CHANGE ITS APPEARANCE, BUT NEVER ITS MIND

German-German prank

By Prof. Slobodan Samardžić, Ph.D. Source Serbia and The World Blog of Boško Mijatović and Slobodan Samardžić

Slobodan Samardzic (Belgrade, March 10, 1953), Ph.D. in political science, full professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade and a former deputy in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. He had been the Minister for Kosovo and Metohija in the second government of Dr. Vojislav Koštunica from 2007 to 2008. Up to 2014 Samardzic had been a member and a Vice-President of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Since June 2015 he has become the President of the Statehood Movement of Serbia (DPS).

Has anyone in Serbia seriously analyzed so-called “The German-German Treaty” signed on December 21, 1972, that our current politicians, headed by Vučić, speaking of with awe? Has anyone ever wondered why and for what reason Serbia, in fall 2007, rejected this interstate agreement as a model for resolving the issue of Kosovo and Metohija?

It was understandable that when Wolfgang Ischinger, one of the negotiating troika members, on his behalf, put forward a proposal in 14 points on the resolution of the province's status, a proposal based on the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between Germany and Germany, DR (1972), our state negotiating team considered seriously the proposal and his model. The first thing that could be spotted was a basic and huge difference between the two situations that the older one (two Germans) could in no way be a role model for the latter (Serbia and its province). Namely, two German states had resolved state statuses, and the Treaty was supposed to open a field of mutual cooperation and normalization of relations. The Treaty explicitly proceeded from the principles of the UN Charter on the territorial integrity of states and the Helsinki Final Act on the inviolability of state borders. Since Serbia and representatives of Albanians (provisional institutions in the province) only negotiated the status of the province under Resolution 1244, which established the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the then FR Yugoslavia, it was not possible to negotiate cooperation and normalization of relations between the two countries by definition. Thus, in our case, the subject of negotiations was to regulate the relationship between the state and the secessionist minority through the international community (UN) in which the territory occupied by the secessionist minority has been in the regime of the protectorate.

It is well known that the two Germans case ended by unification, i.e. the annexation of one Germany to another (1990). In addition to the contentious incompatibility, there was some absurdity in the fact that the proposal that was meant to leading towards the gradual independence of Kosovo was given by the diplomat of the country that had been united. However, Ischinger's proposal was even more inappropriate after the unilateral declaration of “Kosovo” independence in February 2008. Germany was one of the first countries to recognize “Kosovo”. Later on, when Germany became a key player in pressing Serbia to recognize “Kosovo's” independence, the idea of ​​a German-German model has become ironic. So, after Ischinger's proposal since 2007, the idea was reincarnated first in ten points by Angela Merkel (2010), in seven points by Andreas Schokenhof (2011), then in the so-called The First Brussels Agreement (2013), and finally in the obligation of Serbia to sign a legally binding agreement with “Kosovo” on a comprehensive normalization of relations. Although the historical circumstances and legal content of the German-German document are completely different from the First Brussels Agreement and the required new agreement between Serbia and Kosovo ("the overall normalization of relations"), one thing for Germany is decisive, here: modeled on the German-German agreement this Serbian-Albanian must be the agreement of two equal participants. Its true result is the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.

The other side of the coin, in this case, is the behavior of Serbian state representatives. Since 2008, Serbia has lost its state compass in resolving the issue of its southern province. Its permanent yielding to Germany was possible only because Serbia with its will, that is, by the will of its state leadership, turned into a vassal state. Her politicians and her public could silently accept Schokenhoff's political brutalization. Later, Vucic's condescending behavior toward German ministers of foreign affairs and the departures to ritual worshiping of Angela Merkel, became normal. The relaxation of the official Serbia, its political public and the scientific community (above all, legal), later on, has overwhelmed the growth of senior-vassal relations between Germany and Serbia.

There are many indicators for this claim. One extremely illustrative is the visit of German Foreign Minister S. Gabriel to Belgrade and Priština and his message to Belgrade from Pristina. (Most likely this message was delivered directly to the Serbian leadership, and as they were silent, the minister found it appropriate to remind them from Priština). There were several diplomatic pearls. One is that Serbia should accept the independence of Kosovo, and not recognize it, which resembles a diplomatic screwing of Serbian state leadership. But the most important part of this story is the minister's reminder of the model of the German-German treaty, and then a warning that Serbia, in view of the agreement that should sign with Pristina, must change its Constitution (according to “Politika” of the February 15).

The German minister would not approach in this manner towards a country that holds to its own interests, where state officials and their legal services, including the wider legal and scientific public, keep an eye on some politically sensitive matter. Especially because the German minister by connecting the German-German treaty and the issue of the Constitution of Serbia, performed simply an ordinary manipulation. Namely, FR Germany did not have to change its Constitution in order to signing the Treaty with DR Germany. In the preamble to the Basic Law (1949), there was a provision stating that "the entire German people were called upon to achieve the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination." This principle of the preamble was specified in Article 23 of the Basic Law. It is envisaged that German state unity will be achieved by "accessing other parts of Germany" to Germany. When the German-German treaty was signed in 1972, not only FR Germany did not change these provisions of its constitution, but the Federal Constitutional Court, in its proper interpretation, found that FRG was not only the legal successor of the German Reich, but as a state identical to it, although it did not coincide spatially. Apart from that, the aforementioned two provisions of the Basic Law of the FRG, in the preamble and in Art. 23, were replaced by others only after the "accession of other parts of Germany" in 1990. So much about German principles and Serbian political frivolity.

A few days after these Gabriel's bravado from Priština at the expense of Serbia, the voice of the Serbian president, the greatest devotee of German politics in the Balkans, came again. After talks with Angela Merkel, which the German media did not say a word, he said he expects Serbia's EU accession in 2025, because it has been guaranteed by Germany. If so, why did not Angela Merkel declare it, personaly? If Vučić flammed, why did not Germany deny it? If, however, someone thought that there was misunderstandings and contradictions that would be delusional. Everything has been done according to the agreed division of work. Germany neatly faces the Serbian state leadership with the urgent need for recognition of Kosovo, while the Serbian side plays a lull to domestic public opinion, which has solely decided to hibernate during this unpleasant part of history. [Transl. by LG]