General Jovan Milanovic:
Serbia had its spies during the NATO bombing in 1999
Serbia had its spies during the NATO bombing in 1999
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 NATO attacked the country that had been a member of UN, with no declaration of war, and against all International laws. That "DAY WILL LIVE IN INFAMY" [F.D. Roosevelt, 1941.] According to Wikipedia "The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War. The air strikes lasted from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999.". However, that was no "military operation", nor "air strikes", nor "Kosovo war". That was classic terrorist attack, with no declaration of war, on an sovereign State, a member of UN. That was the full scale aggression of 13 NATO countries, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America on Serbia and Montenegro. That was no "Kosovo War", because the attack was conducted on the whole S.R. Yugoslavian territory. The first target, on the March 24, at 19:45 (7:45 p.m.) was the town of Novi Sad, more than 500 km to the North from Serbian Autonomic Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The air strikes were accompanied by land offensive on the South Serbian borders, mainly from Albania, and F.Y.R. Macedonia. The attackers consisted of Albanian regular Army, terrorists of so called "Kosovo Liberation Army", NATO special forces, supported by NATO artillery and air-force. For 78 days of aggression NATO achieved nothing! Their foot stepped on Serbian soil for the first time, only, after Kumanovo agreement. Our Pristina Corps retreated on its own from Serbian Autonomic Province of Kosovo and Metohija, absolutely untouched. Serbia suffered more civilian than military casualties, infrastructure was thoroughly destroyed, and Autonomic Province of Kosovo and Metohija has been under the NATO occupation ever since. NATO lost 120 "flying objects", including one F-117 confirmed, and two more unconfirmed because they managed to escape accross the border. We, simply, didn't know that they were invisible. On the South front, Serb's Air-force had successful missions, including the attack on NATO airport near Tirana, the capital of Albania, where 12 "Apache" helicopters were destroyed on the ground, among other damages. Shqiptar land forces, Albanian regulars and KLA terrorists, suffered heavy loses. Serbs were a perfect match for NATO in underground warfare, as well. NATO aggressor and Shqiptar terrorists gotta have one thing in mind, an one thing only, as gen. Douglas MacArthur said - We came through and we shall return! You can count on that! |
Serbia had its spies during the NATO bombing in 1999. Serb's general Jovan Milanovic, in the book "Serbia and NATO" has admitted there were dozens spies at the highest ranks in the NATO structures.
"I'm probably one of the people in Serbia who had the longest fight against NATO. I was sent on a mission of intelligence in Brussels with the decision of the Supreme Council of Defense in early 1995, after evaluation of the higher institutions state that in a near future conditions are favorable or when are provoked, combat operations will be carried out against Serbia. My task was to build an intelligence network within the structures of NATO, the EU, the Partnership for Peace and other institutions in Brussels dealing with geopolitical issues. I have completed that task," says General Milanovic in his book.
He further notes that by the end of 1998 and until the beginning of "planned aggression" intelligence network he created was significantly expanded.
"This network counted dozens of people at the highest diplomatic level and other diplomatic missions in Brussels," said Milanovic.
Commenting the allegations of Milanovic, military affairs analyst, Vlade Radulovic said he is convinced that Serbia had informants, who, according to him, have been extremely important for the Serbian state during the bombardment.
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| Major Pierre-Henry Bunel, Merci frère |
Commenting the allegations of Milanovic, military affairs analyst, Vlade Radulovic said he is convinced that Serbia had informants, who, according to him, have been extremely important for the Serbian state during the bombardment.
"We certainly have had informants assigned to NATO structures and this is correct. There are people like Frenchman Pierre-Henri Brunel, who has served prison terms for espionage activities, he has written a book which was promoted in Belgrade. There are also people close to our former ambassador, among them the Yugoslav Petrusic. Perhaps this sounds a bit pretentious to say but we had dozens of spies, no doubt we had informers, because in the end we had a result, is the protection of technology and workforce; after 78 days of bombing especially in Kosovo, we have suffered minimal losses. All this shows that there have been people who have helped Yugoslavia and our armed forces with information," concluded Milanovic.
The Glorious Human Factor:
Serbian General Who Botched NATO Plans
The Glorious Human Factor:
Serbian General Who Botched NATO Plans
A decade has passed since General Jovan Milanovic, who worked with Serbian EU mission in Brussels collecting intelligence for the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ) under a diplomatic cover of a minister-adviser, followed NATO activities after learning "from dozens of people in 1998 about the preparations for destruction of our country".
Now retired, General Milanovic spoke for Vecernje Novosti about the ways in which he was able to put together the mosaic of the preparations of North Atlantic Alliance for the first military aggression in its history, and about a meeting with the French army officer Major Pierre-Henri Bunel, who was later charged for treason by the French court, after revealing the confidential NATO documents to Serbian general. General Milanovic considers his last meeting with Bunel an event "of historical significance for the intelligence service and the security of our state". "I told Bunel: 'I know everything, I only need the original NATO document where all this is written down.' He said: 'You'll get it'. Both of us were aware that this was extremely dangerous".
NATO Ranks Serbian Army Intelligence Among the Top Ten in the World
Q: But also very important?
JM: Thanks to this and other documents, Yugoslav Army made plans for state defense. NATO intended to launch an aggression based on a blitzkrieg model: to defeat the army in a short timespan, in several stages, through powerful rocket and aerial attacks against military and civilian infrastructure and thus create conditions for capitulation. Then, they would deploy the ground troops to seize Kosovo and Metohija sector in order to impose and keep the peace. The next goal was for NATO to break the bounds of the defensive Alliance, transforming itself into an aggressive force that would intervene militarily everywhere the US and its allies' interests are at stake. The exposure of the plans has prevented the strategic surprise, both in October 1998 and in March 1999. Based on the knowledge about NATO plans, Serbian Army Headquarters devised a strategy of a permanent dispersion of the units, military technique and material means. This meant the permanent movement and changing of the combat posts. In the military-historical research of NATO aggression against FR Yugoslavia, the model of the applied NATO strategy will not receive passing marks. And in NATO's own analysis, the Yugoslav Army Intelligence Department is ranked among the top ten in the world.
Q: When did you learn that NATO is making plans for bombardment?
JM: In the spring of 1998 KLA was already armed and organized in the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Their weapons came from Albania and the West, where the training camps were established. All of these facts were ignored in the West. In May and June 1998, the things started to complicate and NATO began preparations and planing to intervene. Their military committee received a political directive from the NATO Council to work out the combat plans, and the command in Monse [Washington] was developing an operational part of the concrete aggression plans. On June 23, 1998 I submitted a document titled NATO Preparations for Aggression against FR Yugoslavia.
Q: Did NATO officials know who you really are?
JM: They didn't. I presented myself as a diplomat on the post of minister-adviser. I was openly saying that, given that FR Yugoslavia does not have a military attaché, I was assigned with a task to observe the EU and military-political organizations and alliances. After all, everybody was doing that. Of course, I was also a subject of investigations. Brussels, by the way, is the largest intelligence kitchen in the world. When Bunel was arrested, the media published an article titled Who is Jovan Milanovic? There were all sorts of speculations, until the French sources concluded I was the lieutenant colonel of the KOS (Counterintelligence Service) in Yugoslav Army—which I have never been—who served in Algeria, helping to form the secret intelligence services there.
Q: Did anyone suggest they knew who you are?
JM: Only the Greeks became suspicious, because they were my target group for the initial observations. Despite Bunel's claims, the Greeks never gave me any plans. Two of the top Greek diplomats whom I contacted more frequently, during one meeting when I insisted on precise responses and information, became suspicious of my diplomatic identity. Being professional soldiers and intelligence agents, they asked me: Who are you, really? Since I had great trust in them, I told them that I was a Yugoslav Army colonel. They said: 'Fine, we can talk openly now!' No one else blew my cover. In the middle of 1998, when the preparations for aggression were already in full swing and when I stepped up the frequency of entering NATO, to my request to get in contact with one diplomat, the British NATO delegation sent a request for me to submit my biography.
The Human Factor Remains Crucial
Q: Didn't they already have your biography?
JM: The political branch of NATO was dealing with policy, strategy and doctrine. The intelligence services were engaged in protection of the documents and, according to my assessment, they were not capable of controlling either men, or their contacts, and this is the reason why I was one of hundreds of those who freely roamed NATO offices. What they did not want to say, I would find out in other ways, but I was always leaving NATO with lots of information.
Q: Which methods were you using?
JM: All of them. The legal and illegal ones, known and unknown in theory and practice, and my own original methods. The human factor was crucial and it will remain crucial as long as the intelligence operations exist. All of the people I talked to were mostly against NATO and USA, conflicted with their own conscience due to the jobs they are performing.
Q: Even though they were a part of NATO?
JM: Even though they were a part of NATO. Some would give me the information at the stage when those were only a 'work in progress', enabling me to follow the developments down to the final verification.
Q: You have also received the documents?
JM: I had in my possession each document that was significant for the security and defense of state, including the scenario of the botched command-headquarters exercise 'Crisis South', which worked out the plan of aggression against our country in May 1998.
Late President Milosevic Believed Sanity and Diplomacy will Prevail
Q: How were your information received in FR Yugoslavia?
JM: The state leadership at the time did not believe the aggression would take place, they did not trust the Yugoslav Army, nor its intelligence service. They trusted Holbrooke more than our intelligence service.
Q: Why?
JM: They believed that solution would be reached through diplomacy, that KLA will be defeated, that USA will not resort to force and that the threat of aggression was only used to realize political goals. The culmination of distrust was incredible at the time when the attack on our state was entirely certain. I'm referring to the period of September and October 1998, when October 13 was already set as a date of start of aggression. During that period, I sent a series of messages, moving each morning, like on a chessboard, one by one NATO member to the left or to the right, depending on whether it has changed its position from the day before regarding the aggression.
Q: When have you learned about the bombing targets?
JM: Already at the end of July and in September [1998] I knew the coordinates.
Q: Have your findings been confirmed by the later events?
JM: In entirety, except for the fact that the aggression was more radical from the very beginning than the earlier planning stages suggested.
German General Assessed NATO Needs 70,000 Troops for Ground Invasion of Serbia
Q: There were also talks about the ground operations?
JM: It is interesting that Germany was the biggest opponent to the ground invasion. In July [1998], Germany was assigned a task to make plans for the ground invasion. They believed this would be necessary to establish peace. According to the first plan of the ground operations, which involved several entry routes, some 15,000-17,000 troops were needed. During the further analysis, the scenarios were getting more complex as they were considering the probability of resistance, so they enlarged the troops contingent to 25,000, and then 35-40,000, to finally reach the number of 70,000 troops.
Yugoslav Army General Jovan Milanovic managed to keep his real identity of a highly ranked military officer hidden for years, until Major Bunel was arrested.
The German chief of NATO committee [General Klaus] Nauman was constantly raising the number of troops needed for ground invasion, warning the others about the probable NATO losses and pointing that no one can send so many troops. He wanted to prevent Germany from getting embroiled in a combat situation in Serbia yet again, due to historical reasons. Every time the planned contingent for ground troops was enlarged, they would say: Freeze the operation!
Albright Personally Pushed Each NATO Member Into the Aggression
Q: What was the level of agreement among NATO member states regarding the military intervention against FR Yugoslavia?
JM: The conflict within NATO lasted during the entire summer and fall of 1998 and in 1999. There were member states which refused to accept the act of aggression without the UN Security Council resolution. Greece was guaranteed that Turkish planes will not be allowed to fly over the Greek territory in order to bomb Yugoslavia. France was resisting until the very moment the plan was adopted. Spain, Belgium, and Italy were also resisting, and so was Germany, which accomplished all of it goals with destruction of Yugoslavia and now, along with historical, it also had the internal problem with their constitution and a newly elected parliament. Practically, there were two or three days of total vacuum, due to refusal of certain states to accept the aggression plan.
Q: How was the consensus achieved in the end?
JM: By [Madeleine] Albright launching a diplomatic offensive, where she directly 'persuaded' one country after the other, their leadership. Thus, through the pressures and blackmails, every NATO member state was forced to take part.
French Confiscated the Entire First Edition of Bunel's Book NATO War Crimes
Q: Why was Bunel made to pay the price?
JM: He ventured into something I believe he wasn't quite aware of at first. Even though he didn't have a high rank—he was a major, he had a lot of clout as a chief of cabinet of the head of French delegation in NATO, and an access to confidential informations. He requested the document I needed.
Q: Which document was that?
JM: It was a document with defined targets, stages and the length of aggression. He was charged for handing over two documents, one with 16 and the other with 9 pages. One of those was the plan of the aggression and the other, for which Bunel was sentenced, contained the frequencies of the French bomber planes which were expected to take part in the assaults. He was charged for national treason under the French laws. I did not ask for this document. I told him that I'm not interested in France, because 'I don't want to turn you into a traitor'. He told me: 'I want you to know that France will also take part'.
Q: Was Bunel acting under orders?
JM: I don't believe he was instructed to keep contact with me. At the time I asked for the plans I knew more than he did. But, after all, the rule number one in the intelligence work is to check each important information from at least three sources.
Q: When Bunel was discovered, so were you — were you forced to leave Brussels?
JM: Bunel was in prison, and I was in house arrest, in my apartment or in the embassy, for the total of 59 days. I had no freedom of movement. In mid-November [1998], I was on the discussion agenda of the Belgian parliament. The MPs blamed the ministers of defense and internal affairs for incompetence, because they were not able to discover the fake diplomat in four years. They couldn't even find the legal way to expel me, but they did come up with a dirty plan. I left Brussels 25 days before it was to be realized.
Q: Were you later in contact with Bunel?
JM: Bunel wrote the book NATO War Crimes in prison, which was translated to Serbian. The entire first edition of his book was confiscated in France. At the Belgrade promotion of his book there was a lot of interest for the two men who took part in the operation Le Figaro marked as 'the third most significant after the WWII'. Bunel never regretted his actions. He expressed pleasure that we have met again. In the Literary Club [in Belgrade], he publicly thanked me for enabling him, through those events, to become a writer. He wrote several other books too.
Q: Will you also become a writer?
JM: I will testify in some way about the times when one of the greatest tragedies befell Serbian people.
Those Who Fail to Grasp Russian Stand Today Will Suffer Tomorrow
Q: Why is Serbia today important to Russia?
JM: The situation surrounding Kosovo and Metohija coincided with what is currently happening in Russia. Russia has stood up, it is respected both inside and abroad, it has nearly finalized the process of its consolidation... it has turned around itself and saw an empty space. In order to be sure of its policies, it had to have them verified. Russia has done so in the United Nations, through the issue of Kosovo and Metohija. Russia has a significant position in both G8 and the Shanghai Group. It has immense resources, the need to invest the capital, to import and export and it needs partners. Those who fail to understand the Russian position today will suffer immeasurable losses in the near future.
NATO Wages Wars for Resources
Q: NATO is today talked about as a gas pipeline keeper...
JM: NATO has discarded its primary defense concept. According to the Washington charter, NATO is a defensive alliance, but that is no longer the case. It represents the aggressive military organization that is a danger to the world peace and security. It can now have two reasons for [continued] existence. First, the wars for resources—gas, and very soon, water—rather than their defense. The second is terrorism. Already in 1998 NATO decided on the zones of its future engagement: the Balkans (Kosovo-Metohija province), Middle East—North Africa, Iraq—Iran—Caucasus (reaching to the Russian borders), China, and the war against terrorism anywhere on the globe. In all five zones of its operations, including China (Tibet), it is creating the conditions for military interventions, or the state of 'controlled crises'.
The Aggression Against Serbia Continues
Q: How do you view the way NATO relates to Serbia today, when the alliance is preparing to expand to three more Balkan states?
JM: The more it expands, the weaker NATO becomes due to numerousness and the impossibility of control. The states that entered NATO are neither democratic, nor economically and politically stable. Will Albania or Macedonia be given to veto NATO decisions? Today, from the 10 years distance, I can say that all the issues have remained open and that the aggression has practically only morphed into a different form, the final stage.
Q: Could you elaborate?
JM: During the preparatory stage of aggression there were two concepts, one developed by United States under the NATO umbrella, and the other constructed by Germany. Both of them have been established as a permanent presence not only in Kosovo and Metohija province, but in the entire territory of Serbia. The armed phase is completed, but the consequences and the aims it was meant to accomplish remain unresolved.
Q: What are these aims?
JM: United Nations have failed to fulfill their purpose in the formal and legal sense both then, during the aggression, and today. Serbia continues to be a subject of the aggression through the intelligence services, multinational corporations, destruction of the economic system, tying to the various structures which are opposed to the constitutional and legal status of the state. Therefore, there is only a relative peace on Serbia's territory, everything else remains the same.
Now retired, General Milanovic spoke for Vecernje Novosti about the ways in which he was able to put together the mosaic of the preparations of North Atlantic Alliance for the first military aggression in its history, and about a meeting with the French army officer Major Pierre-Henri Bunel, who was later charged for treason by the French court, after revealing the confidential NATO documents to Serbian general. General Milanovic considers his last meeting with Bunel an event "of historical significance for the intelligence service and the security of our state". "I told Bunel: 'I know everything, I only need the original NATO document where all this is written down.' He said: 'You'll get it'. Both of us were aware that this was extremely dangerous".
NATO Ranks Serbian Army Intelligence Among the Top Ten in the World
Q: But also very important?
JM: Thanks to this and other documents, Yugoslav Army made plans for state defense. NATO intended to launch an aggression based on a blitzkrieg model: to defeat the army in a short timespan, in several stages, through powerful rocket and aerial attacks against military and civilian infrastructure and thus create conditions for capitulation. Then, they would deploy the ground troops to seize Kosovo and Metohija sector in order to impose and keep the peace. The next goal was for NATO to break the bounds of the defensive Alliance, transforming itself into an aggressive force that would intervene militarily everywhere the US and its allies' interests are at stake. The exposure of the plans has prevented the strategic surprise, both in October 1998 and in March 1999. Based on the knowledge about NATO plans, Serbian Army Headquarters devised a strategy of a permanent dispersion of the units, military technique and material means. This meant the permanent movement and changing of the combat posts. In the military-historical research of NATO aggression against FR Yugoslavia, the model of the applied NATO strategy will not receive passing marks. And in NATO's own analysis, the Yugoslav Army Intelligence Department is ranked among the top ten in the world.
Q: When did you learn that NATO is making plans for bombardment?
JM: In the spring of 1998 KLA was already armed and organized in the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Their weapons came from Albania and the West, where the training camps were established. All of these facts were ignored in the West. In May and June 1998, the things started to complicate and NATO began preparations and planing to intervene. Their military committee received a political directive from the NATO Council to work out the combat plans, and the command in Monse [Washington] was developing an operational part of the concrete aggression plans. On June 23, 1998 I submitted a document titled NATO Preparations for Aggression against FR Yugoslavia.
Q: Did NATO officials know who you really are?
JM: They didn't. I presented myself as a diplomat on the post of minister-adviser. I was openly saying that, given that FR Yugoslavia does not have a military attaché, I was assigned with a task to observe the EU and military-political organizations and alliances. After all, everybody was doing that. Of course, I was also a subject of investigations. Brussels, by the way, is the largest intelligence kitchen in the world. When Bunel was arrested, the media published an article titled Who is Jovan Milanovic? There were all sorts of speculations, until the French sources concluded I was the lieutenant colonel of the KOS (Counterintelligence Service) in Yugoslav Army—which I have never been—who served in Algeria, helping to form the secret intelligence services there.
Q: Did anyone suggest they knew who you are?
JM: Only the Greeks became suspicious, because they were my target group for the initial observations. Despite Bunel's claims, the Greeks never gave me any plans. Two of the top Greek diplomats whom I contacted more frequently, during one meeting when I insisted on precise responses and information, became suspicious of my diplomatic identity. Being professional soldiers and intelligence agents, they asked me: Who are you, really? Since I had great trust in them, I told them that I was a Yugoslav Army colonel. They said: 'Fine, we can talk openly now!' No one else blew my cover. In the middle of 1998, when the preparations for aggression were already in full swing and when I stepped up the frequency of entering NATO, to my request to get in contact with one diplomat, the British NATO delegation sent a request for me to submit my biography.
The Human Factor Remains Crucial
Q: Didn't they already have your biography?
JM: The political branch of NATO was dealing with policy, strategy and doctrine. The intelligence services were engaged in protection of the documents and, according to my assessment, they were not capable of controlling either men, or their contacts, and this is the reason why I was one of hundreds of those who freely roamed NATO offices. What they did not want to say, I would find out in other ways, but I was always leaving NATO with lots of information.
Q: Which methods were you using?
JM: All of them. The legal and illegal ones, known and unknown in theory and practice, and my own original methods. The human factor was crucial and it will remain crucial as long as the intelligence operations exist. All of the people I talked to were mostly against NATO and USA, conflicted with their own conscience due to the jobs they are performing.
Q: Even though they were a part of NATO?
JM: Even though they were a part of NATO. Some would give me the information at the stage when those were only a 'work in progress', enabling me to follow the developments down to the final verification.
Q: You have also received the documents?
JM: I had in my possession each document that was significant for the security and defense of state, including the scenario of the botched command-headquarters exercise 'Crisis South', which worked out the plan of aggression against our country in May 1998.
Late President Milosevic Believed Sanity and Diplomacy will Prevail
Q: How were your information received in FR Yugoslavia?
JM: The state leadership at the time did not believe the aggression would take place, they did not trust the Yugoslav Army, nor its intelligence service. They trusted Holbrooke more than our intelligence service.
Q: Why?
JM: They believed that solution would be reached through diplomacy, that KLA will be defeated, that USA will not resort to force and that the threat of aggression was only used to realize political goals. The culmination of distrust was incredible at the time when the attack on our state was entirely certain. I'm referring to the period of September and October 1998, when October 13 was already set as a date of start of aggression. During that period, I sent a series of messages, moving each morning, like on a chessboard, one by one NATO member to the left or to the right, depending on whether it has changed its position from the day before regarding the aggression.
Q: When have you learned about the bombing targets?
JM: Already at the end of July and in September [1998] I knew the coordinates.
Q: Have your findings been confirmed by the later events?
JM: In entirety, except for the fact that the aggression was more radical from the very beginning than the earlier planning stages suggested.
German General Assessed NATO Needs 70,000 Troops for Ground Invasion of Serbia
Q: There were also talks about the ground operations?
JM: It is interesting that Germany was the biggest opponent to the ground invasion. In July [1998], Germany was assigned a task to make plans for the ground invasion. They believed this would be necessary to establish peace. According to the first plan of the ground operations, which involved several entry routes, some 15,000-17,000 troops were needed. During the further analysis, the scenarios were getting more complex as they were considering the probability of resistance, so they enlarged the troops contingent to 25,000, and then 35-40,000, to finally reach the number of 70,000 troops.
Yugoslav Army General Jovan Milanovic managed to keep his real identity of a highly ranked military officer hidden for years, until Major Bunel was arrested.
The German chief of NATO committee [General Klaus] Nauman was constantly raising the number of troops needed for ground invasion, warning the others about the probable NATO losses and pointing that no one can send so many troops. He wanted to prevent Germany from getting embroiled in a combat situation in Serbia yet again, due to historical reasons. Every time the planned contingent for ground troops was enlarged, they would say: Freeze the operation!
Albright Personally Pushed Each NATO Member Into the Aggression
Q: What was the level of agreement among NATO member states regarding the military intervention against FR Yugoslavia?
JM: The conflict within NATO lasted during the entire summer and fall of 1998 and in 1999. There were member states which refused to accept the act of aggression without the UN Security Council resolution. Greece was guaranteed that Turkish planes will not be allowed to fly over the Greek territory in order to bomb Yugoslavia. France was resisting until the very moment the plan was adopted. Spain, Belgium, and Italy were also resisting, and so was Germany, which accomplished all of it goals with destruction of Yugoslavia and now, along with historical, it also had the internal problem with their constitution and a newly elected parliament. Practically, there were two or three days of total vacuum, due to refusal of certain states to accept the aggression plan.
Q: How was the consensus achieved in the end?
JM: By [Madeleine] Albright launching a diplomatic offensive, where she directly 'persuaded' one country after the other, their leadership. Thus, through the pressures and blackmails, every NATO member state was forced to take part.
French Confiscated the Entire First Edition of Bunel's Book NATO War Crimes
Q: Why was Bunel made to pay the price?
JM: He ventured into something I believe he wasn't quite aware of at first. Even though he didn't have a high rank—he was a major, he had a lot of clout as a chief of cabinet of the head of French delegation in NATO, and an access to confidential informations. He requested the document I needed.
Q: Which document was that?
JM: It was a document with defined targets, stages and the length of aggression. He was charged for handing over two documents, one with 16 and the other with 9 pages. One of those was the plan of the aggression and the other, for which Bunel was sentenced, contained the frequencies of the French bomber planes which were expected to take part in the assaults. He was charged for national treason under the French laws. I did not ask for this document. I told him that I'm not interested in France, because 'I don't want to turn you into a traitor'. He told me: 'I want you to know that France will also take part'.
Q: Was Bunel acting under orders?
JM: I don't believe he was instructed to keep contact with me. At the time I asked for the plans I knew more than he did. But, after all, the rule number one in the intelligence work is to check each important information from at least three sources.
Q: When Bunel was discovered, so were you — were you forced to leave Brussels?
JM: Bunel was in prison, and I was in house arrest, in my apartment or in the embassy, for the total of 59 days. I had no freedom of movement. In mid-November [1998], I was on the discussion agenda of the Belgian parliament. The MPs blamed the ministers of defense and internal affairs for incompetence, because they were not able to discover the fake diplomat in four years. They couldn't even find the legal way to expel me, but they did come up with a dirty plan. I left Brussels 25 days before it was to be realized.
Q: Were you later in contact with Bunel?
JM: Bunel wrote the book NATO War Crimes in prison, which was translated to Serbian. The entire first edition of his book was confiscated in France. At the Belgrade promotion of his book there was a lot of interest for the two men who took part in the operation Le Figaro marked as 'the third most significant after the WWII'. Bunel never regretted his actions. He expressed pleasure that we have met again. In the Literary Club [in Belgrade], he publicly thanked me for enabling him, through those events, to become a writer. He wrote several other books too.
Q: Will you also become a writer?
JM: I will testify in some way about the times when one of the greatest tragedies befell Serbian people.
Those Who Fail to Grasp Russian Stand Today Will Suffer Tomorrow
Q: Why is Serbia today important to Russia?
JM: The situation surrounding Kosovo and Metohija coincided with what is currently happening in Russia. Russia has stood up, it is respected both inside and abroad, it has nearly finalized the process of its consolidation... it has turned around itself and saw an empty space. In order to be sure of its policies, it had to have them verified. Russia has done so in the United Nations, through the issue of Kosovo and Metohija. Russia has a significant position in both G8 and the Shanghai Group. It has immense resources, the need to invest the capital, to import and export and it needs partners. Those who fail to understand the Russian position today will suffer immeasurable losses in the near future.
NATO Wages Wars for Resources
Q: NATO is today talked about as a gas pipeline keeper...
JM: NATO has discarded its primary defense concept. According to the Washington charter, NATO is a defensive alliance, but that is no longer the case. It represents the aggressive military organization that is a danger to the world peace and security. It can now have two reasons for [continued] existence. First, the wars for resources—gas, and very soon, water—rather than their defense. The second is terrorism. Already in 1998 NATO decided on the zones of its future engagement: the Balkans (Kosovo-Metohija province), Middle East—North Africa, Iraq—Iran—Caucasus (reaching to the Russian borders), China, and the war against terrorism anywhere on the globe. In all five zones of its operations, including China (Tibet), it is creating the conditions for military interventions, or the state of 'controlled crises'.
The Aggression Against Serbia Continues
Q: How do you view the way NATO relates to Serbia today, when the alliance is preparing to expand to three more Balkan states?
JM: The more it expands, the weaker NATO becomes due to numerousness and the impossibility of control. The states that entered NATO are neither democratic, nor economically and politically stable. Will Albania or Macedonia be given to veto NATO decisions? Today, from the 10 years distance, I can say that all the issues have remained open and that the aggression has practically only morphed into a different form, the final stage.
Q: Could you elaborate?
JM: During the preparatory stage of aggression there were two concepts, one developed by United States under the NATO umbrella, and the other constructed by Germany. Both of them have been established as a permanent presence not only in Kosovo and Metohija province, but in the entire territory of Serbia. The armed phase is completed, but the consequences and the aims it was meant to accomplish remain unresolved.
Q: What are these aims?
JM: United Nations have failed to fulfill their purpose in the formal and legal sense both then, during the aggression, and today. Serbia continues to be a subject of the aggression through the intelligence services, multinational corporations, destruction of the economic system, tying to the various structures which are opposed to the constitutional and legal status of the state. Therefore, there is only a relative peace on Serbia's territory, everything else remains the same.
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