OK, after several days of absence, here I am again. The article I'm going to post is an old one. Exactly 14 years old. However, the subject of this article is still actual. Moreover, my country, the Region, and even broader have been living this article for about 25 years. Ever-since the Fall of the Berlin Wall. So, read it, and enjoy. It is very instructive. The guy who wrote this text is an important Pommy. The geopolitical adviser of one Anthony Charles Lynton "Tonny" Blair, an ex Prime minister of PommyLand and one Catherine Margaret Ashton, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, GCMG, the High European Commission Official.
Intro by LG
In 1989 the political systems of
three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance-of-power and the imperial
urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly,
the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. September
11 showed us one of the implications of the change.
To understand the present, we must
first understand the past, for the past is still with us. International order used
to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient
world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation.
Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through
a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however,
are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together - and it is the
essence of empires that they are diverse - usually requires an authoritarian political
style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability.
Historically, empires have generally been static.
But the balance-of-power system
too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that
eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too
powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the
costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass society and democratic
politics, rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the
balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative
it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination
of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance-of-power in Europe became a bilateral
balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But
it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalistic,
moralist spirit of the late twentieth century.
The second half of the twentieth
Century has seen not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of
the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the
century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them
gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French , British and finally Soviet Empires
are now no more than a memory. This leaves us with two new types of state: first
there are now states - often former colonies - where in some sense the state has
almost ceased to exist a 'premodern' zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian
war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently,
Afghanistan). Second, there are the post imperial, postmodern states who no longer
think of security primarily in terms of conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain
the traditional "modern" states who behave as states always have, following
Machiavellian principles and raison d'ètat (one thinks of countries such as India,
Pakistan and China).
The postmodern system in which
we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or
the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a
highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs,
right down to beer and sausages. The CFE Treaty, under which parties to the treaty
have to notify the location of their heavy weapons and allow inspections, subjects
areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. It is important
to realise what an extraordinary revolution this is. It mirrors the paradox of the
nuclear age, that in order to defend yourself, you had to be prepared to destroy
yourself. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe
has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of distrust and concealment.
Mutual vulnerability has become mutual transparency.
The main characteristics of the
postmodern world are as follows:
· The breaking down of the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs.
· Mutual interference in (traditional)
domestic affairs and mutual surveillance.
· The rejection of force for resolving
disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour.
· The growing irrelevance of borders:
this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through
missiles, motor cars and satellites.
· Security is based on transparency,
mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.
The conception of an International
Criminal Court is a striking example of the postmodern breakdown of the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs. In the postmodern world, raison d'ètat and
the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international
relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies
to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest
in what constitutes a just war.
While such a system does deal with
the problems that made the balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise
of the nation state. While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded
in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important,
identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional
states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable
future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.
Postmodern occupier. German soldier in occupied Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija is photographing the Serb's Church destroyed by Shiptar armed rebels and terrorists. |
If this is true, it follows that
we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half century
of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that Western European
countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless,
played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position. NATO's most
valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is a massive
intra-western confidence-building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided
the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to
the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands
of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions
involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents
a quality and stability of political relations never known before.
The EU is the most developed example
of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency
through interdependence. The EU is more a transnational than a supra-national system,
a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central
power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on
the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only
way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation-state
is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.
European states are not the only
members of the postmodern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a postmodern
state; Japan is by inclination a postmodern state, but its location prevents it
developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since
it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity
or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance
and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do.
Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world
an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for
a postmodern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly,
imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.
Within the postmodern world, there
are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do
not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world , following Clausewitz'
dictum war is an instrument of policy in the postmodern world it is a sign of policy
failure. But while the members of the postmodern world may not represent a danger
to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.
The threat from the modern world
is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the postmodern
world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the
principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability
it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are
the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that
in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation.
The challenge to the postmodern
world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate
on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned
kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to
the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever
is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of
every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating
in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period
of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defenses, both physical
and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state.
The challenge posed by the pre-modern
world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state
no longer fulfils Weber's criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use
of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use
of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare,
but the number of countries at risk grows all the time. Some areas of the former
Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world's major drug-producing
areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign
authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South
America, where drug barons threaten the state's monopoly on force. All over Africa
countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such
areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government
it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.
The premodern state may be too
weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally,
but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the
postmodern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates
take to using premodern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world,
then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous
for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism.
It is not going too far to view the West's response to Afghanistan in this light.
What form should intervention take?
The most logical way to deal with chaos, and the one most employed in the past is
colonisation. But colonisation is unacceptable to postmodern states (and, as it
happens, to some modern states too). It is precisely because of the death of imperialism
that we are seeing the emergence of the pre-modern world. Empire and imperialism
are words that have become a form of abuse in the postmodern world. Today, there
are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps
even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century.
Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government
means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had
a lower GNP per head than Zambia: the one has achieved membership of the global
economy, the other has not.
All the conditions for imperialism
are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet
the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world
in which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which
is open for investment and growth - all of this seems eminently desirable.
What is needed then is a new kind
of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.
We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism,
aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.
Postmodern imperialism takes two
forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually
operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions
such as the IMF and the World Bank - it is characteristic of the new imperialism
that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find
their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment
and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political
and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance.
Aid theology today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit,
they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations
and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the postmodern world has also
opened itself up.)
The second form of postmodern imperialism
might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood
poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime
in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something
like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in
both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid
that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence
is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU
has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia
for all products including most agricultural produce. It is not just soldiers that
come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central
bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained
by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort - in many areas indispensable to it - are
over a hundred NGOs.
One additional point needs to be
made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised
or disorganised crime - which is what state collapse usually amounts to. But Usama
bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today
all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.
The postmodern EU offers a vision
of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic
domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but
also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state -
inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans.
A cooperative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches
the altered substance of the postmodern state: a framework in which each has a share
in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing
principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from
the centre; the 'imperial bureaucracy' must be under control, accountable, and the
servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated
to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth
would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional
road.
That perhaps is the vision. Can
it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be.
In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the premodern
world the interests of organised crime - including international terrorism - grow
greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left.
Robert Cooper is a senior serving British diplomat, and writes in a
personal capacity. This article is published as The post-modern state in the new collection Reordering the World: the long
term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre.
This article was published on Sunday 7 April 2002 in The Guardian
(electronic version)
All the spelling errors has been left as they were in the original
article. (LimanGuerrila)
Sir Robert Francis Cooper, strategist, Knight Commander of the Order
of chivalry - Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knighthood
of Royal Victorian Order (born 1947 in Essex, United Kingdom) is a British diplomat
and advisor currently serving as a Counselor in the European External Action Service.
He is also a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and is an acclaimed
publisher on foreign affairs.
He spent a period in the Cabinet
Office as Deputy Secretary for Defense and Overseas Affairs. He was the UK's Special
Representative in Afghanistan until mid-2002.
In 2002 he began to work for the
European Union (EU). He assumed the role of Director-General for External and Politico-Military
Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. In that
role, he was responsible to Javier Solana, the former High Representative of the
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and has assisted with the implementation
of European strategic, security and defense policy. Since 2007 he has also been
a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
After the Treaty of Lisbon's shake up of EU foreign policy structures, and Solana's replacement by Catherine Ashton, Cooper sat on the steering committee which drew up the proposals for the new European External Action Service (EEAS). After the EEAS, the EU's Foreign Service, was formally established in December 2010 Cooper was made an EEAS "Counselor".
After the Treaty of Lisbon's shake up of EU foreign policy structures, and Solana's replacement by Catherine Ashton, Cooper sat on the steering committee which drew up the proposals for the new European External Action Service (EEAS). After the EEAS, the EU's Foreign Service, was formally established in December 2010 Cooper was made an EEAS "Counselor".
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